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In the Suprente Cottrt of the 
State of Utah 
MARGARET CONOVER and LO·RRAINE 
BEACH, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
BOARD OF EDUCATIO·N, NEBO SCHOOL 
DISTRICf; HARO·LD CHR'ISTENSEN, 
LAVON PAYNE, L. J. CRABB, WILLIAM F. 
BROADBENT, 1DR. JESSE ELLS·WORTH, 
Board Members; and B. L. ISAAC, Clerk of 
said Board, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
IRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
NO. 8048 
We cannot accept the Statement of Facts set out in 
appellants' brief as a complete or proper statement. We can-
not accept the premise of amici curiae's brief, which also 
is based on erroneous fact assumptions. 
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The case was submitted and decided upon an agreed 
stn te1nent of facts, comprised of the allegations of the com-
plaint admitted by the defendants and the affirmative alle-
gations of the answet· which were, by stipulation, taken to 
be true. The plaintiffs, in effect, interposed a demurrer to 
the answer and the case was determined on this basis. By 
this stipulation the plaintiffs waived the introduction of evi-
dence by defendants in support of their answer and now 
cannot be heard to say that the stipulation should be ignored 
and the issues of fact determined against the defendants, 
contrary to the findings of the court because defendants 
took plaintiffs at their word and rested upon the stipula-
tion. Yet, plaintiffs and appellants in their brief, in effect, 
take that very position. Their purported Statement and 
Point 1 in the brief disregard the admitted facts necessary 
for a proper understanding of the case. 
Reference is made to the transcript, consisting of three 
pages of the record on appeal (22-24). The following was 
the understanding: 
"MR. MANGUM: If the Court please, I believe that a 
stipulation at this time would be in order, and I be-
lieve, if I understand it, Mr. Christensen will agree to 
stipulate that the matter be submitted op. the pleadings. 
MR. CHRISTENSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. MANGUM: (co~tinuing) In this case, without 
the taking of any additional testimony, I assume, Mr. 
Christenson,· that the denials which the law gives me, 
as to matters pleaded in the answer, are still available 
to me? There are some things pleaded there in the 
answer that I would not necessarily agree to, but I don't 
believe they are essential in the trial of this matter. 
MR. CHRISTENSON: Of course I am standing on my 
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ans\ver, if the court please. I have admitted all I can 
admit, and I think all I should admit, and we think 
that on the basis of the facts alleged in the answer. 
that \Ve are entitled to prevail. And as I understand 
it, on the basis of the facts stated in the answer, to-
gether \vith our admissions of the facts stated in the 
complaint. to the extent that \Ve have admitted them, 
Mr. Mangum believes that the plaintiffs are entitled to 
prevail. And it is on that basis that \ve are submitting 
the matter. 
MR. MANGUM: Right. 
THE COURT: All right. The record may so show." 
(File, page 23). 
The court's findings of fact refer to this stipulation in 
the following words: 
"The above entitled cause came on duly and regu-
larly for hearing before the court, Hon. Wm. Stanley 
Dunford, Judge, sitting without a jury on the 22nd day 
of April, 1953; and it having been stipulated that the 
.cause should be submitted to the court on its merits 
on the admissions made, and facts alleged, in the ans-
wer which should be taken as true . the 
court now makes the following FINDINGS OF FACT 
" 
The appellants and amici curiae in disregard of the stip-
ulation, have briefed the case on the basis of part only of 
the facts before the trial court. 
When the plaintiffs called in person at the Nebo School 
District office, and asked to be permitted to examine, and 
copy, the minutes of the meeting in question, said minutes 
were not available and only tentative notes of such minutes 
had been transcribed, subject to the approval of the Board 
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of Education; that said tentative notes had not been ap-
pt·ov<'d, and had not been entered in, or made a part of, the 
journal \vhich \Vas kept by the clerk of the said Board of 
Education (Finding 3. p. 27; Answer 4-5, p. 19). 
The rneetings of the board are public and no attempt 
has been n1ade by the board to restrict plaintiffs' attendance 
at such nlPetings or to prevent them from obtaining infor-
mation froJn anyone in attendance thereat as to the happen-
ings of the meeting (Finding 6, p. 28; Answer 10, p. 16). 
I )revious to the meeting in question, release by the clerk 
of tentative notes of proceedings prior to their checking and 
approval by the board has involved inaccuracies in report-
ing the business transacted by the board and its proceedings 
and because of such fact, the board has adopted the pro-
cedw .. e of having tentative notes submitted to it for check-
ing and for approval before they are accepted as minutes 
of meetings; that there has been no effort made to suppress 
·any information as to action or proceedings taken by the 
board, nor to prevent in any way the attendance of the 
plaintiffs or any interested citizens at board meetings, or 
to prevent the plaintiffs or anyone else from examining all 
of its minutes and other official records at the earliest prac-
ticable time, but that plaintiffs by reason of motives per-
sonal to themselves have demanded that the clerk immedi-
ately transcribe his notes and make them available for in-
spection and copying; that all records, including the journal, 
have been properly kept by the clerk and they have always 
been available for inspection of the plaintiffs and that the 
minutes of the particular meeting referred to by plaintiffs 
within a reasonable time after February 18th, 1953, were 
approved by the board and entered in the journal and have 
been available to plaintiffs and other citizens for inspection 
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(Finding 7, pp. 28-29: Ans\ver, Third and Fourth Defenses~ 
pp. 17-19). 
At no time have the defendants or any of them with-
held from the plaintiffs or refused to permit them to inspect 
or to have full access to the official journal of the board, in-
cluding all official minutes or public writings concerning 
the said meetings and that said journal as kept by the clerk 
has been at all times, and is, available for the inspection of 
plaintiffs, or any of them, or any other citizens. That t,he 
action of the clerk of the board in not having the said ten-
tative notes entered in the journal as official minutes of 
said meeting until approved by the board to assure their 
accuracy at the following meeting of the board was, and is, 
reasonable, and that the demand of plaintiffs for a release 
of said tentative notes as public writings the day following 
said meeting was not reasonable or timely (Finding 8, pp. 
29-30; Answer, para. 11 and Third and Fourth Defenses, pp. 
17-19). 
POINTS OR QUESTIONS TO BE DETERMINED 
The appellants argue that the findings of fact of the 
trial court are not supported by the record. Implicit in the 
b1;ef of amici curiae is the same assumption. We have al-
ready set out the facts in this respect and will not repeat 
them. Yet for the sake of raising the direct issue we will 
briefly discuss the point in our argument. The only other 
contention of appellants is that "The transcribed tentative 
notes or minutes are public writings" (App. Brief, p. 8 et 
seq). Counsel for amici curiae apparently concedes that the 
controlling question is whether the tentative notes demanded 
by appellants were public writings (their brief, pp. 3, 14, 15-
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1X). H oweve r, his brief primarily is based on the assump-
tion that the record in question was a public writing or rec-
ord. F'rom this he argues that if newspapers are denied ac-
Ct ·~s to public writings, constitutional rights will be infringed 
c )J' the public interest impaired. Let this be conceded-· and 
\\'t"\ \\'ottld be among the last to argue against it if the prem-
ises of the argument were valid. Most of the brief of amici 
curiae begs the question; more, before a less deliberate body 
it would involve danger through tyranny of concept with-
out reference to facts of confusing and prejudicing the real 
merits of the controversy. 
The "issues", as stated on pages 3 to 4 of the brief of 
amici curiae, and the points indexed and discussed therein, 
do not entirely correspond. Counsel, himself, points out that 
he is presenting the issues mentioned "collectively, since 
they are all interrelated with the position which the amici 
curiae wish to present to this Court.'' Under these circum-
·stances, we see no point in attempting to follow the de~led 
presentation on these collateral phases, statement by state- . 
ment. We will attempt to answer them under the last di-
vision of our argument which seems designed to permit join-
der of issue on the primary contentions of amici curiae. 
We therefore will present our case under the following 
points: 
I. The findings of the trial court, which accept as true-
the allegations of fact contained in the answer in accordance 
with the express stipulation of the parties, is supported by 
the record, for it was by so stipulating that appellants 
avoided the introduction of evidence which might have been 
more unfavorable t6 their contention. 
II. The :notes demanded .by appellants were not "pub-
lic writings." 
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III. To hold that the notes in question \Vere public writ-
ings or that the appellants, rather than the clerk and the 
board, should dictate the exact time such notes should be 
transcribed, completed or entered in the journal \vould nec-
essarily involve the result that tentative memoranda repre-
senting mere steps in mental or administrative processes 
would be subject at any time to demands for copying, cer-
tification, publication and introduction in evidence as proof 
of final action, to the impairment or destruction of the func-
tions of public agencies, including courts; the deceiving and 
confusion of the public and to the injury of the general wel-
fare. 
IV. No constitutional, or other, rights of freedom ot 
the press are involved in' a refusal to treat as a public writ-
ing_ that which is not a public writing; the complaint and 
fact being not that any information was actually denied or 
withheld, or that the tentative notes were accurate, but that 
the respondents failed to recognize and release as an offi-
cial, or public, writing, the tentative notes on which an ac-
~urate journal record would be based after correction and 
upon the completion of the mental and administrative pro-
cesses reasonably necessary to insure their accuracy. 
V. Conclusion: The judgment of the trial court was 
correct and sound that under the admitted circumstances 
set out in the answer the tentative notes made by the clerk 
which were demanded by the plaintiff before their approval 
by the board and prior to their entry in the journal "W!ere 
not public writings within the purview of Sec. 78-26-1, UCA, 
1953; that the notes or memoranda taken by the clerk for 
his own convenience in the process of entering an accurate 
record in the journal are not public records; that a clerk has 
a right to take reasonable steps in assuring the accuracy 
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of journal entries contemplated by the statute; that the 
~tt~ps taken by the respondent for this purpose were not un-
l'<•asonabh•, and that the Court may not require the imme-
diate l'llk•ase of such tentative notes as public records with 
thP incicll~nts of ce1'tification, publication as official action, 
~tnd admissibility in evidence, as sought by the appellants 
in this ('(U~P. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 'l'he findings of the trial court, which accept as true 
t h(• allegations of fact contained in the answer in accord-
aJu·t~ \\'ith the express stipulation of the parties is supported 
by the n·eord, for it was by so stipulating that appellants 
avoided the introduction of evidence which may have been 
n1ore unfavorable to their contention. 
We have set out the stipulation in our statement of fact. 
That stipulation probably authorized the court to make 
findings on mixed questions of fact and law more unfavor-
able to appellants' contention than it did. Yet, in its find-
ings it did not seek to preclude appellants on anything but 
stipulated facts. Respondents were prepared to prove the 
allegation of fact in their answer. The details of appellants' 
motives and conduct, we surmise, were known by appellants 
to be less favorable to them than the relatively brief allega-
tions of the answer. In any event, appellants stipulated that 
the case might be submitted upon the allegations of the ans-
wer. This, in effect, was a demurrer to the sufficiency of 
the answer, or tantamount to a motion by appellants for 
judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. In such 
event the allegations of the answer and all reasonable in-
tendments and inferences therefrom should be taken as 
true and the demurrer should be sustained or motion gran-
ted only if the facts shown were insufficient as a matter of 
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la\\r. Orpheus Vaudeville Co. v. Clayton Inv. Co., 41 Utah 
605, 128 Pac. 575: R. J. Daun1 Constr. Co. v. Child, 247 Pac. 
2cl 817, ____ Utah ________ ; 12(c) URCP. 
After setting out various findings of the court, appel-
lants state (Appellants' Brief, p. 8) that they are "mere al-
legations of respondents, not admitted by appellants." Thus, 
the basis of this surprising contention in view of the stipu-
lation made by appellants in open court, is stated to be that 
"Rule 8(d). . . . provides that such allegations shall 
be taken as denied or a voided . . . . '' This rule covers 
general averments in a pleading to which no responsive 
pleading is required or permitted, they being "Taken as de-
nied or avoided." It manifestly has no reference to stipu-
lated facts, or a submission of a case as on motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings. 
No findings having been pointed out which are not fully 
supported by the facts on which it was stipulated the case 
should be submitted, and appellants being in error as to the 
applicability of rule 8(d), URCP, we submit that the find-
ings of the trial court should be sustained. 
H. The notes demanded by appellants were not pub-
lic writings. 
Actually, the determinative issue in this case is whether 
the notes demanded by appellants under the circumstances 
and at the time demanded were public writings as contem-
plated by Section 78-26-1 and 2, U~CA, 1953. The appellants, 
as well as amici curiae base their claim to the right of in-, 
spection upon this statute. (Appellants' brief, p. 25; brief of 
amici curiae, p. 13). Even the recent book written under 
commission of the American Society of Newspaper Editors 
and slanted from the standpoint of a claim to full freedom 
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of acc-ess by newspapers, concedes that such right of access 
by ne\vspapers, as well as citizens. in general, is limited to 
\vhat 1nay be considered under statutory definition or com-
rnan law "puhlic writings or records." (Haro~d L. Cross, 
"The P<·ople's Right to I<now", Columbia University, 1953). 
1~he right of inspe~tion by the express terms of our 
statut<~ is limited to "public writings." Section 78-26-2, 
UCA, 1953, is as follows: 
"Right to Inspect and Copy. Every citizen has a 
right to inspect and take a copy of any public writing 
of this state except as otherwise expressly provided by 
statute." 
The last authority cited in the brief of amici curiae, 
Nowack vs. Fuller, 219 N. W. 749, 60 A. L. R. 1351, points 
out that when a statute specifically enumerates public rec-
ords for inspection, it excludes others. 
Therefore, if the notes in question were public writings 
the right of inspection and copying existed, as well as to 
have certified copies furnished (Sec. 78-26-3, UCA, 1953), 
and if they were not public writings such right did not exist. 
On this issue we take the liberty of quoting from the 
memorandum decision of the trial court: 
"What are public writings? Section 78-26-1, UCA, 
1953, says: 
tPublic writings are divided into four classes 
(1) Laws 
(2) Judicial records 
( 3) Other official documents 
( 4) Public, records, kept in state, of private writ-
ings.' 
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"l\1inutes of the School Board are neither 'la\vs' or 
'judi<!ial records' nor are they -in their nature, 'private 
"Titings', as the only purpose of their existencP is to 
'keep an accurate journal' (53-6-15, UCA 1953) of the 
doings of a 'body corporate' having an 'official seal' 
(53-4-8, UCA. 1953). They are kept by clerk (53-6-15, 
UCA, 1953) who is elected by the school board (53-6-
3, UCA, 1953) and \:vho may be removed by it during 
his t\Yo-year term by a t\vo-thirds vote (53-6-7, UCA, 
1953). 
"Thus the question narrows to this: are · notes7 
or memoranda, of the proceedings of the school board~ 
taken by the clerk for his own convenience in entering 
the 'accurate' record into the 'journal', 'other official 
documents', so as to bring them within the sub-section 
( 3) , 78-26-1 above and subjecting them to inspection of 
any citizen as set forth in Sec. 78-26-2 above? 
"In determining this question we must keep in 
mind that the records sought by the plaintiffs are 
'public records' (so as to make the plaintiffs' demand 
for inspection and copying efficaceous under Section 
78-26-2, if at all, only by reason of the statute. Thus 
we must carefully observe the language employed by 
the Legislature in setting up what would be considered 
'official documents' of the school board. 
"Section 53-6-15 enjoins upon the clerk the duty 
of keeping a 'journal'. 'Journal' is defined by The New 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Second Edition, Un-
abridged, as: 
' ( 3) A diary: An account of daily transactions or 
events. 
(4) The record of transactions kept by a deliber-
ative body or assembly. Specif. The record of daily 
proceedings of a legislative body kept by a clerk.' 
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"Thus the official record of the board kept by the 
clerk. is not merely an account book, nor merely a min-
ut (' book, nor merely a narrative of acts and duties per-
fnrn;t'd by thP board, but it is all of them combined. 
"At this point in our analysis, special attention must 
be paid to the word 'accurate' in connection with the 
\VOrd 'journal'. That word is defined by the same Web-
stt·r ituthority as: 
'In exact or careful conformity to truth or to some 
standar-d of requirement, exp. as the result of care; 
freP from failure, error or defect; exact as an accurate 
talculator: accurate knowledge.' 
"Certainly it cannot be successfully disputed that 
the legislature in its enactment of 53-6-15 deliberately 
inserted 'accurate' as a limitation of the word 'journal' 
or that the legislative design was to have it given full 
weight under its ordinary definition, and in light of its 
ordinary usage. It did not thus contemplate that hasty 
memoranda made by the clerk under pressure of the 
business of a session of the board and burdened with 
error which reason and common knowledge would ex-
pect to exist in it, should be deemed an 'accurate jour-
nal'. The legislature had in mind such common error 
when it inserted the qualifying word, and it had in full 
contemplation, the damage which may be done the ad-
ministration of our public school system if false or in-
accurate reports of official acts should reach the pub-
lic. It has deliberately provided the safety qualifica-
tion against error by insertion of the word 'accurate'. 
Thus it must be held that memoranda of the happen-
ings at a meeting are subject to determination of their 
accuracy before they become official documents. 
'How is the clerk to determine whether or not his 
tentative notes prepared for insertion into- the official 
journal are accurate? In the first place, it seems evi-
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dent that his efforts should be reasonably calculated 
to produce accuracy. In other words, he could not, un-
der a pretense of determining accuracy, withhold entry 
from the journal for \veeks \Vhile he engaged in a 
lengthy hocus pocus not calculated in reason to result 
in verification of his proposed entries. He must have 
his record of meetings truly and accurately deflect the 
actual happenings at such meetings, for the reason that 
it isn't the record \Vhich authorizes and makes official 
the actions taken by the board. Rather, when a mat-
ter is properly presented and lawful action has been 
taken upon it by the body which has jurisdiction to act, 
their action, and not the record of their action consti-
tutes the authority to proceed in accordance therewith. 
State ex rei Sheridan Pub. Co. v. Goodrich, 140 S. W. 
620. Henshaw vs. State, 47 N. E. 157. City of Talla-
dega v. Jackson Tinney Lumber Co., 95 So. 455. 
"The record is to be made after the official action 
taken, by entry in an accurate history thereof into the 
journal." 
(File 38-40) . 
Appellants say that the issue is not whether the· tenta-
tive notes were at the time involved in such a condition as 
to be a part of the "journal", but whether they were "an 
official document" (p. 25) . If they were not a part of the 
journal they would not be a part of the record the law re--
quires the clerk to keep. 
Appellants argue that it is not the prerogative of the 
board to require approval of minutes kept by the clerk be-
fore they are entered in the journal. It may well be, as they 
urge, that if there were an issue between the school board 
and the clerk as to the manner of keeping the minutes there 
would be significance to a distinction between the supervis-
ory powers of the board, which appoints and can remove the 
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clerk, and the statutory duties of the clerk to keep an accu-
rate record. However, there is no such issue here. The clerk 
in cooperation with the board has deterinined the means 
best adapted for making accurate entri~s in the journal. 
Certainly, cooperation to this end between the clerk and 
the board is not against public po~icy, nor subject to ques-
tion by the appellants. 
We think the trial court rightly pointed out the follow-
ing additional reasons: 
"Is it reasonable, then, for the board to require its 
own approval before proposed entries in the journal are 
accepted for recordation as the official history of the 
acts taken by the board? It appears that this question 
can best be answered by posing others, viz: What 
other means would be so well calculated to produce the 
. statutory requirement for accuracy? Who could know 
what was proposed in a motion so well as the one who 
proposed it, the one who seconded it, and the ones who 
voted upon it? Neither the pleadings nor the argu-
ments suggest any other means equally calculated to 
produce accuracy, and the court can conceive of none; 
"The statute does not prescribe at what time or 
how soon after the happening that an item of the event 
must be recorded in the 'accurate' journal'. Under such 
circumstances, and the rule is so universal as to require 
no citation of authority to support it, where the law 
fixes no limitation upon the time, it must be reasonable. 
No facts are before the court as to the time expiring 
between meetings of the board, nor the time expiring 
after the approving meetings before the minutes of 
meetings are actually entered into the official journal, 
but it does appear that the plaintiffs in the instant case 
demanded an inspection of the clerk's notes, which by . 
then had been transcribed but had not been verified by 
the board nor entered in the journal, on the morning 
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following the meeting in question. How early the next 
n1orning, or \Vhether the board had met in the interiln, 
does not appear. The burden is upon the plaintiffs to 
prove their cause by a preponderance of the evidence, 
and there being nothing in the stipulation to indicate 
to the contrary, the court must, and accordingly does 
hold that the demand was not timely made because no 
opportunity had been had by the board to determine 
or establish the accuracy of the clerk's proposed entries 
and to order the 'accurate' entries to be made in the 
journal. 
"What the plaintiffs sought to inspect was not pub-
lic record under the provisions of 78-26-1, supra, and 
plaintiffs were therefore not entitled to inspect them 
under the authority to inspect public writings under 
the provisions of 78-26-2, supra. 
"The plaintiffs' primary contention is that the notes 
taken by the clerk at the board meeting, and particu-
larly after such notes have been transcribed for pre-
sentation to the next meeting of the board for approval, 
although not yet made part of the 'journal' are admis-
sible as evidence of the matters contained therein in an 
action at law or _equity nnder the provisions of 78-25-3 
and 78-25-4, UCA, 1953, and that, therefore, they are 
themselves public records coming within the class of 
'ather official documents' denominated by 78-26-1, and 
are thus subject to inspection and copying as provided 
by 78-26-2. · In considering this question, it must be 
kept clear·ly in mind that Section 53-6-15 does not re-
quire, or even provide for, the taking of the men1o-
randa by the clerk during board meetings, or the tran-
scription of any tentative copies thereof for approval 
of the board. Its requirement is that the clerk shall 
keep an 'accurate journal'. 
"Such rna terials are thus not 'entries in public or 
other official books or records made in the performance 
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of duty' as provided in 78-25-3, nor are they entries 
'made by an officer or board of officers, or under the 
direction or in presence of either in the course of official 
duty' as provided in Section 78-25-4. The same ~/ebster 
authority cited above, so far as the definition is appli-
cable to the problem here involved, defines 'entry' as 
an 'act of making or entering a record, as an entry of 
a sale. Also that which is entered; an item; a putting 
upon record in proper form or order'. Inscription of 
notes by the clerk, or the tentative transcription there-
of prior to entry in the 'accurate journal' any more than 
the clerk's individual recollection of the items of busi-
ness transacted at a meeting of the board, are not 'offi-
cial documents', and because they are not, they are not 
admissible in evidence as a public record, Steiner v. 
McMillan (Mont)., 195 Pac. 836; State v. Ray (Mont) 
2944 Pac. 368; Steel v. Johnson (Wash) 115 P.2d 145, 
and are not within the provision of the startute granting 
citizens the right of perusal." 
Appellants go further than merely to contend that they 
have the right to inspect public writings-they assume 
the prerogative of dictating or having the court at their be-
hest dictate the time and the manner in which the clerk 
transcribes the minutes and enters the minutes in the jour-
nal. They conclude their brief by contending in effect that 
even though the clerk might have been justified in declining 
to turn over the particular notes requested by them at the 
particular time, yet the court should declare that as of that 
time, the clerk should have made his accurate entries in the 
journal so that it would have been available immediately to 
appellants. 
We think this is rather presumptive on the part of ap-
pellants, and that it would be beyond the prerogative of the 
court to dictate exactly when and how the clerk as an ad-
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:ninistrative matter \vas to perform his duties, in opposition 
to the board, entrusted with his supervision, and contrary 
to the judgment of the clerk himself. There is nothing in 
the statute \Vhich required the accurate entry in the journal 
to be made immediately; and indeed, if there were such a 
requirement, the failure to allow proper time would preclude 
the very accuracy enjoined. 
We believe that the trial court was correct in holding 
that it was not unreasonable for the clerk to take proper 
time to insure accuracy of the entry. We quote from pages 
~5-47 of the memorandum decision: 
"As pointed out in the recital of facts supra, the 
board meeting in question was held on February 18, 
1953. During some hour of the following day the de-
mand was made by plaintiffs to examine the minutes 
of the meeting. By that time the clerk has assembled 
his notes apparently made concurrently with the meet-
ing and had transcribed them into a tentative copy for 
submission to the board for rejection, amendment or 
approval as the board may direot. While it is clear 
that the board requires such approval before entry of 
the minutes into the journal, and that such approval is 
accomplished at the succeeding meeting, there is no in-
dication as to how frequently or infrequently such meet-
ings are held. Certainly if the succeeding meeting were 
scheduled for the afternoon or evening of the 19th no 
one could say that the delay caused by the rule of the 
board would be an unreasonable restriction. Likewise 
if the board was not to meet for a month after the meet'3 
ing in question, the time would as clearly be unreason-
able, under the urgence of the argument, at least, of 
the plaintiffs, that actions would be taken in the in-
terim affecting substantial rights of citizens which 
would likely render plaintiffs' contrary efforts ex post 
facto if so much time were consumed. 
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"It is easily conceivable that the variation in length 
of 'a reasonable time' in order to complete the 'journal' 
may be great depending upon the nature of the business 
transacted, e. g. if the board had voted to employ all 
school funds in its hands in construction of a street rail-
way to pick up and deliver pupils to the schools and the 
proposed contract of construction were to be signed 
within the week, such a matter is not the same at all 
as an action taken by the board to change the type of 
notebooks to be supplied for the succeeding year. The 
duty of the clerk to have his proposed entries in the 
journal determined to be accurate would have added to 
it a duty of action so immediate as to allow no other 
duty to interfere with promptness in the first instance, 
while he would conceivably have no duty of urgency at 
all in the second. 
"Where 'accuracy' of the journal is· enjoined by 
the express wording of the statute, the legislature con-
templated that some reasonable means would be de-
vised by the board to insure that quality. The legis-
lature did not specifically prescribe such means, and 
therefore left it to the sound discretion of the board, 
which appoints and supervises the duties of the clerk, 
to devise such processes of its own as would meet its 
duty to insure both accuracy, and reasonable prompt-
_ness as is enjoined by the law insuring all citizens the 
right of inspection and copying. 
"·Of common necessity there must always be some 
time between formal action of any legislative or admin-
istrative body and the formation of the 'official docu-
ments' evidencing the act. Thus, so long as the board 
here acted with reasonable promptness and dispatch, 
having in mind the nature of the business, and all of 
the facts and circumstances surrounding it, the body 
discharged the duty imposed upon it by law, and no 
citizen is entitled to complaint that the 'accurate' jour-
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nal' \Vhich is the only 'official document' respecting ac-
tions of the board, had not been prepared instanter for 
their inspection and copying. 
"Nothing appearing in the record to indicate that 
the defendants unreasonably delayed preparation of its 
official record, or denied the plaintiffs inspection \Vhen 
it was prepared, it follows that the plaintiffs' petition 
for a decree requiring the- defendants to promptly tran-
scribe the minutes of their meetings and make the1n 
immediately available for inspection and copy must be 
and is accordingly denied." 
(File 45-47). 
Section 53-6-15, UCA, 1953, in addition to providing 
that the clerk shall keep an accurate journal of its (the 
board's) proceedings, also provides that "He shall perform 
such other duties as the board or its committee shall re-
quire." It is not contemplated that the clerk should work 
at loggerheads with the board, but ~ather that he should 
cooperate with the board. If he thinks, as appears from the 
record here, that the discharge of his duty with respect to 
making accurate entries in the journal can best be aceom-
plished by having the assistance of the board, this should 
not render his action any less proper or reasonable. 
We call attention to the case of Kent, et al v. School 
District, (Okla) 233 Pac. 431, in which the court stated (p. 
432): "Comp. Stat. 1921, para. 10355, defines the duties 
of the clerk but nowhere requires that he shall record the 
minutes of any meeting before the meeting adjourns. It is 
the general, if not the unvarying, custom in this state for 
the minutes of deliberative and administrative boards, cov-
ering either regular or special meetings, to be recorded and 
presented for adoption at the next succeeding regular meet-
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ing. In the absence of conflicting statute, no reason is ap-
parent why this rule should not control in school board meet-
ings.'' 
The entries in the journal are merely a means of proof 
or record of official action and do not constitute the action. 
Appellants emphasized in their ·complaint, and emphasize in 
their brief, that the school board has on occasion taken ac-
tion based upon resolutions adopted in meetings even before 
the entries were made in the journal. They err in assuming 
that such action would not be proper. Of course, when it 
comes to the proof of the action taken at the meeting the 
journal entries are the best evidence. 
Appellants have cited cases holding that in the ab-
sence of an official writing such as a journal entry, the 
clerk's tentative notes may be looked to to define the action 
taken at a meeting. This, of course, does not make the 
clerk's tentative notes the official writings or record but 
merely secondary proof as to what actually occurred. Un-
der certain circumstances, the testimony of persons present 
may be looked to in the absence of an official record to 
show what action actually was taken. Yet, ·could it be con-
tended that the declaration of a third person so looked to1 
even though in writing, were official records? 
As of possible interest in this connection, reference is 
made to the annotation, "Necessity, Sufficiency and Effect 
of Matters of Record of Meetings of School Board," 12 ALR 
235, and the cases cited therein, and in the Blue Book sup-
plements to such annotations. 
We submit that the tentative notes of the clerk were 
not a "public writing" within the contemplation of the stat-
ute. 
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m. To. hold that the notes in question \\'el'C public 
\Vritings or tha.t the appellants rather than the clerk and 
the board can dictate the time such not~s should be tran-
~cribed, ~co1upleted or entered in the journal would neces-
~arily involve the result that tentative men1oranda repre-
senting mere ·steps in n1ental or administrative processes 
\vould be subject at a.ny time to de1nands for copying, e:: r-
tifica.tion, publication and introduction as proof of final ac-
tion, to the impairment or detriment ,of public agencies, in-
cluding courts; the deceiving and confusing of the public 
and t() the injury of the general welfare. 
Section 78-26-2, UCA, 1953, dealing with the right to 
inspect and copy public writings has been quoted. Section 
78-26-3, UCA, 1953, provides that every public official hav-
ing the custody of a public writing which a citizen has the 
right to inspect is bound to give him, on demand, a certified 
copy of it on payment of the legal fee therefor. Rule 44(e) 
URCP, defines an official record consistent with the statute, 
and Rule 44(a) governs the admissibility in evidence of an 
authenticated copy, and Rule 44(d) provides that a copy 
a.f any official record or entry thereof in the custody of a 
public officer of this state or the United States, certified by 
the officer having custody thereof, to be a full, true and 
correct copy of the original in his custody, may be read in 
evidence in an action or proceeding in the courts of this 
state in like manner and with like effect as the original could 
be if produced. 
If it were to be held that the tentative notes of the clerk 
in question were public writings or official records within 
the purview of Sec. 78-26-2, giving the right to inspect and 
copy, they would, of course, be public writings for the pur-
poses of Sec. 78-26-3, concerning the furnishing of certified 
::opies, and they \Vould be an official record for the purpose 
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of admissibility as evidence upon the certification of the cus-
todian. 
The court found, based upon the stipulation of fact, 
that in the past the ·clerk had released tentative notes prior 
to their checking, which involved inaccuracies. It was a 
fair, usual and wise precaution to avoid this that the means 
were adopted which appellants now question. If appellants 
are correct, they would have the right not only with respect 
to the tentative notes in question, but with respect to the 
tentative or rough notes or memoranda of any clerk of court 
or clerk of any other public body to demand inspection and 
certified copies, and their introduction in evidence in any 
court. Mere steps in the mental or ministerial processes 
of a clerk in the making up of an accurate record would 
thus be published or otherwise established as the final record 
at any stage. If this were so, a newspaperman, or any other 
citizen, could demand the tentative memorandum of the 
clerk of this honorable Court or of a trial court before any 
final entries are made, and indeed, while an argument is 
progressing, no matter how rough, misleading, or incomplete 
their form; could publish them in their unfinished, rough 
and perhaps misleading form, to the disaster of public ser-
vice. 
The appellants and amici curiae have no vested rights 
in the mental or ministerial processes of clerks, whether 
they be school board clerks or clerks of this honorable Court, 
so long as public writings in the statutory sense are not in-
volved. The appellants and amici curiae take the position 
that the notes of the clerk are necessarily public writings, 
no matter how tentative, incomplete or inaccurate. 
There is nothing in the record to show that the partic-
ular notes in question were complete or acclirate, and the 
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~ourt found upon the stipulated record that they vvere mere-
ly tentative. So contending, undoubtedly appellants would 
treat or publish as official and final any notes released. Un-
less public bodies, in cooperation with their clerks, can adopt 
reasonable measures to insure the verity of minutes before 
their release as public writings, the pubHc interest would 
irreparably suffer \vithout any b-enefit whatsoever to 'the 
cause of a free press or the people's right to know the truth, 
but with aid and comfort to the cause of misinformation and 
distortion. The same thing applies to every governmental 
activity. If appellants and amici curiae can dictate how and 
\vhen records are to be transcribed and that they must be 
released as official without checking or approval of any 
kind, they can carry such demands into every office in the 
state, to the utter disaster of public administration. 
Suppose all clerks, including the clerk of this honorable 
Court, is bound to release as an official writing anything 
put down in tentative or memorandum form without check-
ing or revision at the time anyone may demand inspection. 
If an entirely erroneous record, unverified or in rough form, 
be made with the idea of revision, under this theory it still 
would have to be released and ,certified to as an official writ-
ing at any stage in the process of formulating it, so long as 
it was in writing. If this were so, some weird "public writ-
ings" would result, including possibly a notation on the pad 
of the clerk of this Court, if perchance he should check over 
this brief, that "The attorney for respondent fs guilty of the 
constant repetition of an obvious point." This may be true, 
but it may have no place in the clerk's official record. Be·-
fore any such record is required to be released as a public 
\vriting, the clerk in connection with the Court, should at 
l.east be permitted to check it over; before the repetition in 
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the Court's mind becomes inescapable, the writer will pass 
to other phases of the case. In all earnestness, we do con-
tend, however, that the position of appellants and amici 
curiae on general principles and upon examination from 
practical, as well as legal, standpoints is untenable. 
We do not believe that the authorities cited by appel-
lants, the reasoning of those authorities, sustain appellants' 
position; indeed, the cases cited indicating that memoranda 
n1ay be looked to as a foundation of nunc pro tunc entries 
or orders., in the absence of official writings, only emphasize 
the position of the respondents. So, also in many states can 
other forms of testimony be utilized to show what the ac-
tion actually was in the absence of official writings, but this 
does no ·mean that such oral testimony or such other secon-
dary evidence can be looked to as a substitute for official 
writings rather than as an aid to their formulation. 
The case of State v. Hunter, 127 W.Va. 38, 34 S. E. 2d 
468, while containing a general definition of a public record, 
which appellants seem to prefer to our statutory definition, 
involves a holding directly opposed to appellants' conten-
tion. Morrison v. White, 10 c·al. Appl. 61, 252 P.2d 261, 
shows that the time the entry is actually made in the jour-
nal is a mere detail under the control of the responsible of-
ficer, but it likewise fails to support appellants' position. 
Other authorities cited by appellants also seem not to sup-
port their position, but to sustain in principle the reasoning 
involved in respondents' position. There seems to be no 
point of further analyzing these decisions as even appellants 
do not seem to contend that any of them are directly in 
point. 
To adopt the contention of appellants, we submit, would 
bring into our law and practice several disastrous doctrines~ 
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~ncluding the doctrine that the individual citizen, or the 
court at his request, should determine in detail in point of 
time and specific manner the means to be used by clerical 
or administrative officers in discharging the duties entrusted 
peculiarly to them; the doctrine that in any stage in an ad-
ministrative, clerical or mental process carried on by a pub-
lic officer the particular status of his record in its incom-
plete and unfinished form can be demanded, and thus frozen, 
and its certification required as a public writing; the doc-
trine that the requirement that the clerk keep an accurate 
journal should be interpreted as meaning that any memo-
randa written out by the clerk as a preliminary to keeping 
that accurate journal must, itself, be considered as the ac-
curate journal, notwithstanding its incompleteness or inac-
curiacies; and the doctrine that clerks may not lawfully act 
in cooperation with their supervisory boards in discharg-
ing the duties entrusted to them. 
We submit that both from the standpoint of law and 
of practice, the contentions of the appelants are not well 
taken, and that measured from either standpoint the deter-
mination of the trial court was correct. 
IV. No constitutional or other rights of freedo1n of 
the press are involved in a refusal to treat as a !lJublic writ-
ing that which is not a public writing; the complaint of the 
appellants and amici curiae, !and the facts, being not that 
any infonnation was actually denied or withheld or that 
the tentative notes of the clerk were accurate or complete 
when deman~d, but that the )respondents failed to recog-
nize and release as official and public writings the tentative 
notes on which an accurate journal record would be based 
after correction and lupon the completion of the mental and 
administrative processes reasonably necessary to insure 
their accuracy. 
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The impressive array of amici curiae has no controlling 
point in this case. In almost every proceeding before this 
Court, the rule to be announced will affect more or less large 
numbers of persons throughout the state in similar situa~ 
tions; yet the weighing of the issues by the number is not 
a procedure whi~ch has any place or hope here, and is nbt 
a procedure necessarily conducive to correct results. We 
may, therefore, be pardoned for our failure to enlist as par-
ticipants the numerous clerks, offices and agencies--in-
deed, the great body of our citizenry--to be adversely af .. 
fected by a reversal of the decision of the trial court herein. 
We believe that it goes without saying that if newspapers 
or any other elements in our society can demand and pub~ 
lish, or establish, as final offi~cial writings, the rough notes 
or memoranda of the record keepers before they purport to 
be accurate public records of any proceeding, the proper 
administration of the very Government, including courts, 
whose protection the newspapers require, would be rendered 
impossible. 
There is no showing whatsoever in this case that any-
one was deprived of the right to ascertain the true facts con-
cerning the meeting of the school board. It is admitted that 
the meeting was public and that anyone had the right to at-
tend or to secure information from any source. There is 
no showing that the defendants did not have full informa-
tion of what happened at the meeting, or that the clerk 
himself would not give them all information in his posses-
sion. The only showing is that he declined to release his 
tehtative notes as official writings at that ti·me. It is es-
tablished that within a reasonable time and in the discharge 
of his statutory duties, the clerk did in fact enter an accu-
rate record of the proceedings in the journal required by 
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la\v to be kept by him, and that such record, or any other 
official record, has never been denied appellants or anyone 
else by the clerk or by the board. This is not a case involv-
ing freedom of the press, as amici curiae seeks to show; no 
one has sought to prevent publication of any proceedings 
or to suppress any official records; no one seeks to. This 
is a case where the appellants demanded the release, not of 
an official writing, but unreasonably demanded that tenta-
tive notes not comprising an official record be released as 
an official \Yriting for use as such. If freedom of the press is 
to be destroyed in this country, it may well be by recogni-
tion of similar ill-advised contentions as here made, leading 
to such abuse and injury to the public welfare and the pro-
cesses of government as to create a reaction incompatible 
with full support for this great doctrine. 
We refer again to the recent book, "The People's Right 
to Know" (Harold L. Cross, Columbia University, 1953), in 
which we believe one would expect to find the most favorable 
presentation of the claim of newspapers to freedom of ac-
cess to information, since the book was commissioned by the 
:National Newspaper Alliance. The brief of amici curiae 
on the general subject of freedom of the press sets out some 
of the cases contained in the publication mentioned, but a 
vast array of others, or on other phases of the problem, but 
with particular reference to rights of newspapers, is set out 
by Mr. Cross, including a large number of cases concerning, 
and references to, "Records Not Subject to Public Inspec-
tion." Mr. Cross, in stating the general rules as to records, 
lays down the following principles, supporting his statement 
\vith numerous authorities: 
"1. The record must be 'public' in the legal sense. 
A record which is kept by public officers in public offi-
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ces in the business of the public is not necessarily c. 
'public record' in the sense of being subject to inspec-
tion. 
"It is clear that the mere fact that a document or 
paper is deposited or on file in public offi,ce or is with 
or in the custody of a public officers does not make it 
a public record. The term 'record' is ordinarily applied 
to public records only. Generally there is no single test 
which may be applied to determine what are and what 
are not public records. ~he primary test is definition~ 
which is dealt with in Chapter IV. 
"2. The term 'public' should be read with the word 
'record' in the state statutes. Re·cords which are sub-
ject to inspection, except as otherwise provided by stat-
utes, are those only which are public. That is the case 
whether or not the particular statute uses the word 
'public.' Thus, the Florida statute in terms grants any 
citizen a right of inspection of 'All state, county and 
municipal records . ' (Appendix 3). Neverthe-
less, the only records subject to the right of inspection 
are those that are public, and that means only those 
held 'public' by the courts or in opinions of the A ttor-
ney General. 
"The effect of this is that there must be read into 
the state statutes regarding inspection, whether con-
tained there or not, the word 'public'. This applies, as 
stated, to Florida and other states. Most state statutes, 
however, use the term 'public' to modify 'records'. (Ap~ 
pendix 3) " 
(P. 33). 
Mr. Cross also concedes at various points in his fine 
book that i:f the ordinary citizen does not have the right to 
inspect a writing as a public writing, a newspaper or a news-
paperman does not. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
If amici curiae herein question these basic propositions, 
\ve can best refer the Court to the exhaustive study men-
tioned, \Vhich certainly is from the viewpoint most favor-
able to their contentions. If they do not question these pro-
positions, most of the arguments and authorities cited in 
their brief lose their point. To say that the general citizen 
is not entitled to the right to inspect unless there is Involved 
a public writing in connection with which subject the right 
is created by the statute, vvhile a newspaperman has an un-
limited right of inspection by virtue of the statute is not ar-
guing for freedom of the press, but for special privilege in-
consistent with our theory of Government. 
An analysis of the cases cited has not proved produc-
tive of facts and situations in point. We have no quarrel 
\vith the rules of statutory construction that all pertinent 
·::>r related statutes must be construed together, in support 
of which it was considered necessary by amici curiae to cite 
numerous cases; but it is not shown by the cases or by any 
reasoning of theirs that in construing the pertinent statutes, 
together or singly, the writing in question was a "public writ-
ing" \vithin the contemplation of the Utah statute or that 
the failure of the clerk to release it as such public writing 
impaired in any way the freedom of the press. 
We do not question that a newspaper has the right to 
immediate access to public writings so as to acquaint the 
public with the action of the board, but we do deny that a 
newspaper can, or that a court should, dictate unreasonable 
and impracticable standards as to the making of the public 
record, such as is attempted by the appellants here. 
Several of the cases relied most strongly upon by amici 
curiae turn on specific statutes not ·having any cormterpart 
in our law. For instance, in re: Becker, 192 N. Y. Supp. 
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754, Sec. 54 of the general municipal law was involved, pro-
viding that all "'Books, minute, entries or accounts and the 
books, bills, vouchers, checks, contracts or other papers con~ 
nected with or used or filed in the office of or with any offi-
' cer, board or commission . are hereby declared 
to be public records " Records, receipts and 
disbursements in the mayor's office were deemed to come 
within this statutory definition. Also, Sears Roebuck Co. 
v. Hoyt, 107 N. Y. Suppl. 2nd 756, turned on a special stat~ 
ute, as did a number of the other cases cited. In re: Hays 
73 So. 362, cited by amici curiae on p. 22 of their brief, arose 
on motion to quash a rule upon the defendant newspaper~ 
man to show cause why he should not be attached for con-
tempt, and involved a law allowing inspection of the rec-
ords of the city, except those of the law and police depart-
ments. It is therein indicated that the publishers of news-
papers have no higher rights than others to publish the 
conduct of the courts and that such rights are limited by 
the obligation to observe respect for truth and fairness. 
Except for the general principles of freedom of the 
press with which we heartily concur, we believe that what 
has been argued concerning public writings and the facts 
in this case in relation thereto, answer the contentions of 
amici curiae as fully as the limitations of this brief will per-
mit. We submit that amici curiae have added no good rea-
son why the judgment of the trial court should not be sus-
tained. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court was correct and sound, 
that under the admitted circumstances set out in the answer 
the tentative notes made by the clerk which were demanded 
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by the appellants before their approval by the board and 
prior to their entry in the journal were not public writings 
\Vithin the purview of Sec. 78-26-1, UCA, 1953; that the 
notes or memoranda taken by the clerk for his own con-
venience in the process of entering an accurate record in 
the journal are not public records; that a clerk has a right 
to take reasonable steps in assuring the accuracy of the 
journal entries contemplated by the statute; that the steps 
taken by the respondents for this purpose were not un-
reasonable, and that the Court may not require the immedi-
ate release of such tentative notes as public writing with the 
incidents of certification, publication as official action, and 
admissibility in evidence, as sought by the appellants in this 
case. 
The findings of the trial court are adequately suppor-
ted by the record. The conclusions of the trial court are in 
accordance with the law, every fair concept of freedom of 
the press, and are practicable from the standpoint of reason 
and administration. The contentions of the appellants and 
amici curiae, if adopted, would lead to confusion and public 
injury. The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, 
\vith costs to respondents. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON 
CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON 
Attorneys for Respondents 
First Security Bank Bldg. 
Provo, Utah 
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